Abstract-The smart grid has been considered as a nextgeneration power system to modernize the traditional grid to improve its security, connectivity and sustainability. Unfortunately, the grid is susceptible to malicious cyber attacks, which can create serious technical, economical and control problems in power network operations. In contrast to the traditional cyber attack minimization techniques, this paper proposes a recursive systematic convolutional (RSC) code and Kalman filter based method in the context of microgrids. Specifically, the proposed RSC code is used to add redundancy in the microgrid states, and the log maximum a posterior is used to recover the state information which is affected by random noises and cyber attacks. Once the estimated states are obtained, a semidefinite programming based optimal feedback controller is proposed to regulate the system states. Test results show that the proposed approach can accurately mitigate the cyber attacks and properly estimate and control the system states.
I. INTRODUCTION
The smart grid can provide an efficient way of supplying and consuming energy by providing two-way energy flow and communication [1] . It can integrate multiple renewable distributed energy resources (DERs) which are environment friendly, low green house emission and effective to alleviate transmission power losses. The associated connectivity and advanced information/communication infrastructure make the smart grid susceptible to cyber attacks [1] , [2] . Statistics in the energy sector show that more than 150 cyber attacks happened in 2013 and 79 in 2014 [1] . As a result, the power outage cost is about 80 billion per year in the USA. Usually, the utility operators amortize it by increasing the energy tariff, which is unfortunately transferred to consumer expenses [3] . The renewable microgrid incorporating DERs can be a potential solution, but it needs to be properly monitored as its generation pattern depends on the weather and surrounding conditions. One of the smart grid features is that it can integrate multiple microgrids and monitor them using reliable communication networks.
Since the generation pattern of a microgrid varies on the time-place basis so its operating condition should be closely monitored. Therefore, the microgrid state estimation is an important function in the smart grid energy management system (EMS). As shown in Fig. 1 system state estimation is an essential task for the monitoring and control of the power network. In order to monitor the grid information, the utility company is deployed a set of sensors around them. The communication infrastructure is used to send grid information from sensors to EMS. The accurately estimated states can also be used in other functions of EMS such as contingency analysis, bad data detection, energy theft detection, stability analysis, and optimal power dispatch [4] . Many studies have been carried out to investigate the cyber attacks in smart grid state estimations. To begin with, most of the state estimation methods use the weighted least squared (WLS) technique under cyber attacks [6] , [7] , [8] . Chi-Square detector is also used to detect those attacks. Even though this approach is easy to be implemented for non-linear systems, it is computationally intensive and it can not eliminate the attacks properly [6] , [5] . To this end, the WLS based l 1 optimization method is explored in [4] . Furthermore, a new detection scheme to detect the false data injection attack is proposed in [9] . It employs a Kullback-Leibler method to calculate the distance between the probability distributions derived from the observation variations. A sequential detection of false data injection in smart grids is investigated in [2] . It adopts a centralized detector based on the generalized likelihood ratio and cumulative sum algorithm. Note that this detector usually depends on the parametric inferences so is inapplicable to the nonparametric inferences [9] . Thereafter, a Kalman filter (KF) based microgrid energy theft detection algorithm is presented in [3] .
Many feedback control algorithms have been proposed to regulate the system states. The most established approach is the linear quadratic regulator (LQR) method [10] , [11] , [12] . It is shown in [13] , [14] that designing a state feedback controller framework for a general case of polynomial discrete-time system is quite challenging because the solution is nonconvex. Thus, the convex method based controller design has gained growing interest in the research communality. Driven by the aforementioned motivations, this paper proposes a recursive systematic convolutional (RSC) code and KF based cyber attack minimization technique in the context of microgrids. The key contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• A microgrid incorporating multiple DERs is modelled as a discrete time linear state-space equation considering the uncertainty and cyber attack in the measurement.
• An RSC code is proposed to mitigate the impairments and introduce redundancy in the system states. The log maximum a posterior is adopted to recover the state information which is affected by random noises and cyber attacks.
• After estimating the system states, a feedback control strategy for voltage regulation of the microgrid is proposed based on semidefinite programming. This proposed control scheme acts as a precursors in term of network stability and the operation of DERs.
II. MICROGRID SYSTEM MODEL
A microgrid is a small-scale power network that can operate independently or be connected to the main grid. The considered N micro-sources in this study are connected to the main grid. For simplicity, we assume that N=4 solar panels are connected through the IEEE-4 bus test feeder as shown in Fig. 2 [15] , [16] . Here the input voltages are denoted by [16] .
T , where v pi is the i-th DER input voltage. The four micro-sources are connected to the power network at the corresponding Points of Common Coupling (PCCs) whose voltages are denoted by
T , where v i is the i-th PCC voltage. Now by applying Laplace transformation, the nodal voltage equation can be obtained:
where
) and Y(s) is the admittance matrix of the entire power network incorporating four mico-sources. Based on the typical specifications of the IEEE 4-bus distribution feeder [16] , the admittance matrix is given in (2). Now we can convert the transfer function form into the linear state-space model [16] . The discrete-time linear dynamic system can be derived as follows:
where 
and Δt is the discretization parameter.
III. OBSERVATION MODEL AND CYBER ATTACK
The measurements of the microgrid states are obtained by a set of sensors and can be modelled as follows:
where z(k) is the measurements, C is the measurement matrix and w(k) is the zero mean sensor measurement noise whose covariance matrix is R w . Generally, the objective of attackers is to insert false data into the observations as follows:
where y(k) is the measurements considering cyber attacks, and a(k) is the false data inserted by the attacker [1] , [2] , [3] . The attackers have complete accesses to the system infrastructure so that they can hijack, record and manipulate data according to their best interest. In this paper, the cyber attack pattern is similar to those illustrated in [1] , [2] , [17] . Figure 3 shows the observation model and cyber attack process in the context of microgrid state estimations. To secure the system states, in the signal processing research community, the channel code is used. Motivated by the convolutional coding concept [18] , [19] , the microgrid statespace and observation models are regarded as the outer code. Then the standard uniform quantizer performs quantization to get the sequence of bits b(k). b(k) is encoded by RSC channel code which is regarded as the inner code. Generally speaking, RSC code is characterized by three parameters: the codeword length n, the message length l, and the constraint length m i.e., (n, l, m) . The quantity l/n refers to the code rate which indicates the amount of parity bits added to the data stream. The constraint length specifies m-1 memory elements which represents the number of bits in the encoder memory that affects the RSC generation output bits. This paper considers a (2, 1, 3) RSC code and (1 0 1, 1 1 1) code generator polynomial in the feedback process. As shown in Fig. 4 , this RSC code produces two outputs and can convert an entire data stream into one single codeword. The codeword is then passed through the binary phase shift keying (BPSK) to obtain s(k). s(k) is passed through the additive white Gaussian noisy (AWGN) channel with some noise. To illustrate, Fig. 4 shows the proposed cyber attack protection procedure in the context of microgrids. At the end, the received signal is:
where e(k) is the AWGN noise. The received signal is followed by the log-maximum a posteriori (Log-MAP) decoding for this dynamic system. The Log-MAP works recursively from the forward path to the backward path to recover the state information [18] . The Log-MAP output is sent to demodulation and de-quantization and then finally used by the state estimation method.
IV. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR CYBER ATTACK MINIMIZATION IN MICROGRIDS
Generally, the forecasted system state estimate is expressed as follows [20] :
wherex(k − 1) is the estimated state of the last step. Then the forecasted error covariance matrix is given by:
where P(k − 1) is the estimated error covariance matrix of the last step. The observation innovation residual d(k) is given by:
where y rd (k) is the dequantized and demodulated output bit sequence. The Kalman gain matrix can be written as:
The updated state estimation is given by:
Finally, the updated estimated error covariance matrix P(k) is expressed as follows:
After estimating the system state, the proposed control strategy is applied for regulating the microgrid states. In order to regulate the microgrid states, define the following feedback control law [10] , [11] , [12] :
by minimizing the following cost function:
Here F is the state feedback gain matrix, Q z and R z are positive-definite state weighting matrix and control weighting matrix. By using (15) and standard trace operator (m Dn = tr[Dnm ]), (16) can be expressed as:
and it can be written as follows:
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whose feasibility is equivalent to
It can be observed that the (20) is nonlinear because it involves the multiplication of variables P and F. This prevents a straightforward application of linear matrix inequality. Fortunately, one can introduce a new variable H = FP and rewrite the (20) as follows:
Now according to the Schur's complement, (21) can be transformed into the following form:
From (17), F and P can be found by minimising the following expression:
Based on the H = FP, (23) can be transformed as follows:
subject to
According to the Schur's complement, we can rewrite (25) as follows:
We can finally formulate the proposed optimization problem as follows: 
Finally, the feedback gain matrix is computed as:
The performance of the proposed method is analysed in the next section.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The simulation parameters are summarized in Table I . The mean squared error (MSE) versus signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is presented in Fig. 5 . It can be observed that the proposed method significantly outperforms the existing KF method [1] . For better visualization of the cyber attack, the state (Δv 1 and Δv 2 ) versus time step results are illustrated in Figs. 6-7 1 . It can be observed and expected that the cyber attack enormously affects the system states when KF filter is 1 Other states have similar estimation performance. used to estimate system states [1] . In other words, there is a significant fluctuation due to the random noises and cyber attacks. Interestingly, the proposed RSC based cyber attack protection technique can regulate the system impairments by introducing redundancy and protection in the system states. As a result, the proposed method can estimate microgrid states accurately even if there is cyber attacks and noises.
Unfortunately, it is noticed that the actual PCC state deviations increase dramatically, which is very dangerous in terms of network stability and microgrid operation. Thus, it is necessary to apply a suitable control technique, so that the PCC voltage deviations are driven to zero. After applying the proposed control method to the microgrid connected to the IEEE 4-bus distribution system, it can be seen from Fig. 8 that the proposed controller is able to keep the voltage deviations to zero by the time k=100, which acts as a precursor in terms of network stability and proper operation of microgrids.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a cyber attack minimization based dynamic state estimation technique and feedback control algorithm in microgrids. An RSC coded cyber attack protection technique is proposed to add redundancy in the system states. Then a Log-MAP decoding can assist to extract the system states from the received signal which is polluted by random noises and cyber attacks. In order to regulate the voltage deviation, this study proposes an semidefinite programming based optimal feedback control method. The effectiveness of the developed approaches is verified by numerical simulations. These findings can help to design the future smart control center under cyber attacks. Consequently, it is encouraged to use environment-friendly renewable microgrid and the utility 978-1-5090-4168-8/16/$31.00 ©2016 IEEE operator can monitor and control the power network properly. In the future work, packet losses and delay will be investigated in terms of system performance. 
